Many lives might be saved if inoculations against cow flu were routinely administered to all people in areas where the disease is detected However since there is a small possibility that a person will die as a result of the inoculations we cannot permit i

This argument puts forward that despite the social benefits of cow flu inoculations, this procedure should not be routinely permitted on account of the risks associated with it. Lives might be saved through inoculations, but they are also risked through them. This danger is sufficient to prevent the inoculations in the future. Though this argument seems reasonable at first glance, it leaves several questions unanswered.

First, it fails to consider the relative risks of death in either case. That is, though it contrasts the 'many lives' that may be saved from the inoculations with the 'small possibility' of death that may result from them, it does not compare the relative magnitudes of these risks. For insance, consdider a town of 100,000 people in which 1,000 people die of cow flu each year. If the risk of death from the inoculation is 0.1%, then fewer people would die if the vaccine were routinely administered – only 100. The argument in questino must therefore be evaluated in light of numerical evidence comparing the rates of risk. Though the deaths from the inoculation would be incredibly tragic, if there is a net reduction in deaths as a result, permitting the vaccine may be the most desirable option.

An illustrative example comes from a very mundane aspect of human life: cars. Many people drive to work, school, or other important locations in cars each day. Cars even save many lives: People who need to be rushed to the hospital generally travel in an ambulance. Thus, many lives and lives worth living are made possible through car travel. However, when a person travels by car, there is also a small possibility that she will die in an accident as a result. Does that small possibility warrant a blanket ban on car travel? Clearly, it does not. In principle, people are willing to accept a small risk of death for a reasonable improvement in their life or chance of living. Permitting the inoculation simply reflects another application of this general rule.

Second, the argument does not specify whether the inoculations will be mandatory. If it is not, it is unclear why there is a substantial problem with permitting the procedure. If a person consents to take on the risk of a dangerous medical procedure, then that is their prerogative. In fact, patients suffering from life-threatening diseases often take the opportunity to use treatments that are still in development when given the chance. Though they must be informed of the risks of such a procedure, it is not only irrational but even coldhearted to refuse them the chance of recovery if they would like to take it. Parallelly, if one wants to reduce one's own chance of facing cow flu by taking on the risk of dying from the innoculation, one should be able to do so. At worst, one harms only oneself; at best, one saves one's life.

Lastly, it does not consider the relative costs of inoculating people against cow flu and treating people with it. Even if the risks of death in either case are comparable, it could be the case that inoculations are incredibly cheap while treatment is very expensive. If so, the economy and healthcare system of regions ravaged by cow flu may be improved by permitting inoculations, even if there is roughly no change in the number of lives saved. Such an outcome may save further lives down the line.

In all, this argument neglects a few crucial areas. It ignores the comparative danger of cow flu and the inoculation, it does not account for reasonable precedents that allow for voluntary participation in risky medical procedures, and it fails to consider the broader economic ramifications of the policy.